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 Political and Constitutional Obligation 
Louis Michael Seidman* 
 
 
 
 
 In his provocative, courageous, and original new book,1 Abner Greene argues that there is 
“no successful general case for a presumptive (or ‘prima facie’) moral duty to obey the law.”2 In 
my own book,3 I argue that there is no moral duty to obey our foundational law – the 
Constitution of the United States. This brief article addresses three issues related to these claims. 
First, I discuss what seem to me to be important ambiguities in and problems with Professor 
Greene’s argument. Second, I defend my own stance against criticisms advanced by Greene and 
others. Third, I explore the relationship between his claims and mine. 
I. 
 In the first half of his book, Professor Greene makes two separate claims. First, he insists 
that there is no general prima facie obligation to obey the law.4 Second, he defends a concept that 
he labels “permeable sovereignty.”5 On this view, the state sometimes, but not always, has an 
obligation to permit individuals acting pursuant to religious or other norms to disregard the law.6  
 Professor Greene is not as clear as he might be about the relationship between these two 
claims. Greene does not think that the government is always obligated to permit conscientious 
objectors to disregard its laws. He favors a “balancing approach” under which “[t]he required 
exemptions would be prima facie only, permitting government to resist them through showing a 
compelling state interest.”7 
The ambiguity about the relationship between Greene’s two claims arises when we 
examine the cases that are not covered by permeable sovereignty. Perhaps Greene thinks that 
recognition of a right to disregard the law in some cases is sufficient to establish an obligation to 
obey the law in other cases. Alternatively, he may believe that although desirable, permeable 
sovereignty is insufficient to establish a general duty to obey the law. 
Unfortunately, both interpretations of Greene’s argument create problems. In Section A, I 
argue that if the first interpretation is right, then Greene is not really rejecting political 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I am tremendously 
grateful to James Fleming and Boston University School of Law for organizing the symposium that provided the 
occasion for this article. Thanks as well to Robin West and to Abner Greene and to the  other participants in the 
symposium for their comments. 
1 ABNER S. GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION: THE MULTIPLE SOURCES OF AUTHORITY IN A LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 
(2012). 
2 Id. at 2. 
3 LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, ON CONSTITUTIONAL DISOBEDIENCE (2013) [hereinafter SEIDMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL 
DISOBEDIENCE]. 
4 See GREENE, supra note 1, at 35-113 (explaining why agent-centered, natural duty, and systemic stability theories 
do not create a general obligation to obey the law). 
5 Id. at 2-3 (“[W]e should see sovereignty as permeable through to our plural sources of obligation, rather than as 
absolute in the state and its laws.”). 
6 See id. at 114-60 (discussing three exemptions to general legal obligation in favor of other sources of normative 
authority).[ES: I corrected the page span and removed the extra comma after “id.” I also italicized “id.” This page 
span is long, but this covers a chapter that discusses the concept of “permeable sovereignty.” There is a subsection 
called “Permeable Sovereignty and the Religious Clauses,” but this section is very narrow and I think some of the 
other sections in this chapter do a better job of expanding on the idea of permeable sovereignty.] 
7 Id. at 118. 
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obligation, at least as that concept is usually understood. In Section B, I argue that if the second 
interpretation is right, then individuals outside the realm of permeable sovereignty have no 
obligation to obey the law. Because Greene thinks that individual obligation and state legitimacy 
are correlative, the state acts illegitimately when it punishes these individuals. But what, then, 
could it possibly mean to say that permeable sovereignty does not cover these cases? 
A. 
We cannot hope to sort out these problems without first clarifying what the political 
obligation controversy is about in the first place. I take the controversy to be about whether law 
can have a trans-substantive, bridging function. What I mean by this is that for political 
obligation to take hold, we must provide reasons why people should obey a law even when they 
have moral and political views that are inconsistent with the law. In other words, we must 
explain why the law bridges our substantive moral differences and why it trumps our substantive 
moral commitments. 
There are, of course, a wide variety of theories of varying plausibility that attempt to 
respond to this challenge. For present purposes, the important point is that none of these theories 
holds that just anything that calls itself “law” can serve a trans-substantive bridging function. In 
this sense, all theories of political obligation are limited. Of course, some are more limited than 
others. For some theorists, law must satisfy only the most minimal standards to command 
obedience; for others, the standards are more demanding. But virtually no one defends the 
authoritarian claim that anyone claiming to speak for the law must be obeyed.8 
I will not attempt to survey all of these theories here. Instead, I limit myself to some of 
the most prominent examples. Some natural law theorists approach, 9 or at least have been 
understood to approach,10 the problem of political obligation as one of defining what constitutes 
law. On this view, unjust laws simply are not laws. John Finnis, perhaps the most prominent 
modern natural law theorist, denies that natural law theory depends upon the definition of law. 
He claims that “a theory of natural law need not have as its principal concern . . . the affirmation 
that ‘unjust laws are not law’” and asserts that he “know[s] of no theory of natural law in which 
that affirmation, or anything like it, is more than a subordinate theorem.”11 But even if the 
problem cannot be resolved by definition, Finnis, together with virtually all natural law theorists, 
insists that “for the purpose of assessing one’s legal obligations in the moral sense, one is entitled 
to discount laws that are ‘unjust’ . . . . Such laws lack the moral authority that in other cases 
comes simply from their origin, ‘pedigree’, or formal source.”12 
Other variants of the natural law position are also conditional. For example, Ronald 
Dworkin’s influential if idiosyncratic version of natural law theory holds that law should be 
obeyed, but only if it exhibits integrity and treats everyone with equal concern and respect.13 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Cf. Nimmer Sultany, The State of Progressive Constitutional Theory: The Paradox of Constitutional Democracy 
and the Project of Political Justification, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 371, 378-81 (2012) (arguing that liberal 
constitutional theory is preoccupied with the conditions necessary to make law legitimate). 
9 For citations to St. Augustine, Plato, Cicero, Aristotle, and Aquinas asserting that unjust laws should not count as 
laws, see JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 363-64 (2d ed. 2011) (explaining that St. Augustine, 
Plato, Cicero, and Aristotle often remarked that unjust laws were not truly laws, and Aquinas agreed with a slightly 
different but related proposition). 
10 See, e.g., H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 17, 32-33 
(R.M. Dworkin ed., 1977) (asserting that natural lawyers believe that “what is utterly immoral cannot be law”). 
11 FINNIS, supra note 9, at 351. 
12 Id. at 360. 
13 See RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS 330 (2011) (“A political community has no moral power to 
create and enforce obligations against its members unless it treats them with equal concern and respect; unless, that 
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Similarly, Lon Fuller’s procedurally inflected version of natural law holds that law must be 
obeyed to the extent that it comports with law’s internal morality.14 
Positivists, like H.L.A. Hart, resist the natural lawyer’s alleged insistence on resolving 
political obligation through definitional fiat. Positivists deny the claim that law, by its very 
nature, must satisfy moral criteria. Something can count as “law” even if it is morally repulsive.15 
Nonetheless, positivists also limit the legal duty to obey. This is true in two respects. First, 
positivists have their own definitions limiting what counts as law. These definitions do not 
include a moral component, but they also do not include everything16 Obviously, there is no legal 
obligation to obey a measure that is not a law in the first place. Second, the fact that positivists 
reject the incorporation of the “ought” question into the definition of law does not mean that they 
reject the necessity of answering that question. On the contrary, the fact that law can be evil puts 
the “ought” question into sharper focus. Precisely because law can be morally bad, there may be 
a right – indeed, perhaps an obligation – to disobey some laws.17 
Proceduralists like Henry Hart and Albert Sacks attempt to bridge this is/ought divide. 
Like positivists, they claim that law can be substantively immoral, but like natural lawyers, they 
also claim that law nonetheless has an “ought” component – but importantly, only because it is 
formulated by fair procedures that people with different views could accept as a mode of settling 
their differences.18 It seems to follow from this stance that the “ought” component of law drops 
out if it is not formulated by these procedures. 
Similarly, John Rawls’s entire, massive philosophical project revolves around the effort 
to give an account of the liberal state such that people with diverse “comprehensive doctrines” 
will have an obligation to respect political outcomes.19 The project makes sense only on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
is, its policies treat their fates as equally important and respect their individual responsibilities for their own lives.”).  
CF. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 166-67, 190-216 (1986) (discussing Dworkin’s theory of the “virtue of 
political integrity”). 
14 See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 96-97 (rev. ed. 1969) (“What I have called the internal morality of 
law is . . . a procedural version of natural law . . . . The term ‘procedural’ is . . . broadly appropriate as indicating that 
we are concerned, not with the substantive aims of legal rules, but with the ways in which a system of rules for 
governing human conduct must be constructed and administered if it is to be efficacious and at the same time remain 
what it purports to be.”). 
15 See Hart, supra note 10, at 32-34 (distinguishing between the natural law idea that law cannot be immoral, and the 
simpler and more useful proposition that “laws may be law but too evil to be obeyed”). 
16 See, e.g., JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED AND THE USES OF THE STUDY OF 
JURISPRUDENCE 9-13 (Noonday Press 1954) (law consists of commands of the sovereign backed by the threat of 
force); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 56-61 (2d ed. 1994) (law consists of measures as to which certain actors 
take an “internal point of view”). 
17 See Hart, supra note 10, at 32-34 (distinguishing between the natural law idea that law cannot be immoral, and the 
simpler and more useful proposition that “laws may be law but too evil to be obeyed”). 
18 See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND 
APPLICATION OF THE LAW 4 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (“[D]ecisions which are the 
duly arrived at result of duly established procedures of this kind ought to be accepted as binding upon the whole 
society unless and until they are duly changed.”). 
19 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 115 (1971) (“[I]f the basic structure of society is just, or as just as it is 
reasonable to expect in the circumstances, everyone has a natural duty to do his part in the existing scheme.”); JOHN 
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 217 (expanded ed. 2005) (“[O]ur exercise of political power is proper and hence 
justifiable only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens may 
reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to them as reasonable and rational. 
This is the liberal principle of legitimacy.”). 
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assumption that states that do not meet minimal liberal criteria do not deserve respect and 
obedience.20 
All of these thinkers, then, defend various forms of conditional political obligation. 
People must obey the law, but only if the law is conceived of in a certain way or meets certain 
standards. Their stance is trans-substantive and bridging in the sense that the criteria for 
legitimacy do not include mere personal disagreement with a particular law. The position of 
these thinkers is nonetheless limited because their very project is to formulate law in a fashion 
that generates obligation to obey. 
In contrast, opponents of political obligation think that there is no such formulation. Their 
claims are also limited, but in a different way. Just as defenders of political obligation are not 
authoritarians, opponents of obligation are not nihilists. Opponents reject political obligation, but 
not all obligation. On the contrary they reject a prima facie obligation to obey legal norms 
precisely because they privilege obligation to some extra-legal set of norms.21 
Of course, it does not follow from this position that all laws should be disobeyed. Where 
law coincides with extra-legal norms or where the extra-legal norms do not speak to the issue, 
one may indeed be obligated to do what the law commands.22 Opponents of political obligation 
merely insist that this obligation cannot be separated from the rightness of the extra-legal norms 
that are the obligation’s source. On this view, we cannot decide whether it is right or wrong to 
obey a particular law without first resolving our disagreement about whether the particular law is 
just.23 
Greene characterizes his project as defending this anti-obligation stance against the 
proponents of political obligation, but I am not so sure that this is really what he has done. At 
least on one reading, his argument fits comfortably within the political obligation canon. If he is 
indeed arguing that recognition of permeable sovereignty is sufficient for law to claim 
obedience, then, like virtually all defenders of political obligation, he is setting forth criteria for 
when obligation takes hold.24 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 See JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES WITH “THE IDEA OF PUBLIC REASON REVISITED” 78-80 (1999) (arguing 
that respect for human rights is a necessary condition for legitimate state authority). 
21 See, e.g., A. John Simmons, The Duty to Obey and Our Natural Moral Duties, in IS THERE A DUTY TO OBEY THE 
LAW? 91, 190-91 (2005) (“[I]f by ‘legal disobedience’ we mean simply ‘not performing the act (or forebearance) 
identified by the law as obligatory,’ then nothing so dramatic about the moral justification of disobedience to law in 
fact follows from my conclusion. . . . [W]e often have good moral reasons, and even moral duties and obligations, to 
perform in the ways the law makes institutionally obligatory.”). 
22 See, e.g., id. at 91 (“[W]e often have good moral reasons, and even moral duties or obligations, to perform in the 
ways the law makes institutionally obligatory.”). 
23 See, e.g., id. at 95, 101 (defining moral duty to obey the law as “a duty to do as the law requires because it is 
required by valid law . . . not to do as it requires just insofar as it happens to overlap with independent moral duties” 
and arguing that there is no “widespread duty to obey the law, even in reasonably just political societies”). 
24 In his article published in this symposium, Greene denies that his book promotes permeable sovereignty as 
sufficient to establish general political obligation. See Abner S. Greene, What is Constitutional Obligation, 93 B.U. 
L. REV. n. 4 (2013) (“I do not argue that if the state accommodates a citizen’s religious or other practice, the citizen 
thereby has a moral duty to obey the law, i.e., political obligation. Accommodation is at best a partial remedy for the 
problem posted by the state’s claiming a general authority over all of us through all of its laws.”). Of course, no one 
knows better than Greene himself what argument he intended to make in his book. Nonetheless, there are passages 
in the book that are at least ambiguous on this score. See infra note 26 (noting language where Greene seems to 
concur with proponents of political obligation in arguing that permeable sovereignty is trans-substantive and 
bridging). More to the point, if Greene really thinks that permeable sovereignty does not establish general 
obligation, then it is hard to make sense of his argument for limits on permeable sovereignty. I explore this point 
below. See infra Part I.B. (explaining that if permeable sovereignty does not establish a general political obligation, 
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Of course, his criteria are different from those advanced by others. The criteria deserve to 
be evaluated on the merits, a task I undertake in the next section.25 For now, though, the 
important point is that on this reading of his book, Greene’s difference with other believers in 
political obligation is not about the basic point of the enterprise. He is not claiming that questions 
of obligation are inevitably inseparable from questions of substantive justice. On the contrary, he 
seems to believe that many people who will benefit from permeable sovereignty are acting in the 
interests of unjust causes.26 Greene’s claims for permeable sovereignty are therefore trans-
substantive and bridging. He wants people with different substantive views to embrace his 
system of permeable sovereignty, and he thinks that the system will bridge our moral and 
political differences. 
B. 
If this reading is correct, then Greene has mistitled his book and mischaracterized his 
project. That is reason enough to doubt that the reading is correct, and these reasons are 
reinforced by Greene’s article in this symposium disavowing this interpretation.27 Accordingly, 
in this section I pursue an alternative reading of his book. Perhaps Greene does not think that his 
permeable sovereignty proposal solves the problem of political obligation.28 On this reading, 
state-recognized exemptions for conscientious objectors softens the problem but does not 
eliminate it. Although the conflict will arise in fewer cases, it will still be true that objectors who 
do not satisfy Greene’s criteria for an exemption will have no obligation to obey the law. 
If this is what Greene means, then he has indeed advanced an argument against political 
obligation. But this reading presents a couple of serious problems of its own. First, Greene 
believes that questions of personal obligation on the one hand and state legitimacy on the other 
are correlative.29 State commands are legitimate only if the individual has an obligation to obey 
the commands. If permeable sovereignty does not solve the problem of political legitimacy, then 
individuals have no obligation to obey commands not covered by permeable sovereignty when 
those commands conflict with their moral commitments. Moreover, the correlativity thesis 
means that because these individuals have no obligation to obey, the state acts illegitimately 
when it insists on obedience. But if the state command is illegitimate, then the state should not 
have issued it in the first place. The result is the creation of a right to exemption in cases where 
Greene claims that there is no such right.30 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
then individuals who do not fall within Greene’s envisioned exemptions have no obligation to obey the law, and the 
exemptions themselves lose meaning). 
25 See infra Part I.B. 
26 See GREENE, supra note 1, at 157 (“[M]y position is deferential to (even illiberal) persons/groups desiring to 
depart from law and live by their own lights.”). 
27 See supra note 24 (quoting the passage from Greene’s symposium response disavowing the idea that permeable 
sovereignty implies a general political obligation). 
28 At one point, Greene asks whether permitting qualified exit from laws should be viewed as supporting the state’s 
legitimacy or only as a partial remedy for citizens confronted with laws that conflict with their normative 
commitments. He asserts that his “inclination is to view exit options as a remedy, rather than as the missing piece of 
the legitimacy/obligation puzzle. For even a robust system of exit options doesn’t fix the problems . . . with theories 
of political obligation; rather, it acknowledges the difficulties and responds by letting people free from the clutches 
of the state.” GREENE, supra note 1, at 114-15. He then proceeds, though, by claiming that either way one views the 
problem, we should dispense with plenary state authority. Id. 
29 See id. at 5 (endorsing “a principle of correlativity, arguing that the state’s political legitimacy and a citizen’s 
moral duty to obey the law go hand in hand”). 
30 For a similar criticism along these lines, see David Lyons, Reason, Morality, and Constitutional Compliance, 93 
B.U. L. REV. (2013) (“Professor Greene argues that the government should grant exemptions to some of its 
restrictive laws. That is a moral not a legal argument, which presupposes that the government has a moral right to 
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A specific example helps illuminate the contradiction. Greene strongly suggests that a 
pharmacist who resists dispensing an abortifacient medication on religious grounds should not be 
entitled to an exemption when the abortifacient would otherwise be unavailable, especially to 
indigent women.31 Suppose, then, that the state attempts to enforce its general statute requiring 
the sale against a pharmacist with such a religious belief in the circumstances Greene describes. 
Because permeable sovereignty does not solve the problem of political obligation, the pharmacist 
has no obligation to obey the law. But then the state is acting illegitimately when it insists that 
the pharmacist obey, and under Greene’s logic the pharmacist is entitled to an exemption after 
all. 
This first problem suggests that on Greene’s own argument, he has not extended the 
exemption right far enough. If permeable sovereignty is insufficient to rescue political 
obligation, then the opt-out right must be generally available. A second problem is that he may 
have extended the right too far. Recall that true opponents of political obligation insist that 
obligation to obey cannot be disentangled from substantive moral positions. If one assumes this 
stance, then what are we to make of Greene’s insistence that officials have an obligation to 
respect a putative constitutional right to an exemption? Why should not this right itself be tied to 
the moral worthiness of the cause supported by the particular exemption? If law really cannot 
serve a trans-substantive bridging function, then how can the law of exemptions stand above our 
moral disagreements? 
Perhaps the answer depends on a rule utilitarian argument. While a specific claim to 
exemption may rest on substantively unjust grounds, we might nonetheless be better off with a 
general rule providing for exemptions. Greene suggests that such a rule might be justified by 
epistemic modesty.32 We cannot be sure that we reach morally sound conclusions, so as a general 
rule it makes sense to respect moral difference. 
Unfortunately, this position is in some tension with Greene’s insistence elsewhere that 
obligation must be justified on the retail, rather than the wholesale level.33 After all, proponents 
of the general obligation to obey the law make a similar rule utilitarian argument. They claim 
that the systemic benefits derived from obedience outweigh the individual costs of obeying a few 
unjust laws.34 Ironically, this claim is also rooted in epistemic modesty: How can dissenters be 
certain enough that they are right to justify defiance of the majority? Greene rejects this kind of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
demand compliance with the laws in question. But Professor Greene seems to give us no reason to suppose that the 
government has a moral right to demand compliance with any of the laws to which he believes exceptions should be 
made. And, until the case for a moral right to demand compliance with those laws is made, there is no need to justify 
exemptions.”). 
31 See GREENE, supra note 1, at 156-57 (“[T]he exemption right is prima facie only, and is subject to a balancing 
test, which here would include considerations such as the medical situation of the woman requesting an abortion and 
the availability of abortion providers. How to balance the equities in the case of pharmacists who resist dispensing 
abortifacient medication on religious grounds also depends on the circumstances, which include the availability of 
such medications in the community, especially for indigent women.”). 
32 See id. at 3 (defending the “virtues of seeing things differently”). 
33 See id. at 32-33 (“[B]asically legitimate governments can exercise justified coercive authority – but on a law-by-
law or case-by-case basis, rather than wholesale, as the justification conception requires. And when the state 
exercises justified authority law by law or case by case, then subjects have a moral duty to obey that particular law 
or instance of law’s application. Government can produce benefits from its coercive authority and its institutionality 
that private action cannot yield.”).[ES: “Id.” should be italicized and it does not need to be followed by a comma. I 
also swapped the author’s pincite for a pin that seems to better support the proposition in the text. 
34 See, e.g., KENT GREENAWALT, CONFLICTS OF LAW AND MORALITY 106-07 (1989) (characterizing rule utilitarian 
argument for obedience as one “that did not reduce to a balance of consequences on the particular occasion”). 
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argument with regard to a general obligation to obey the law. Why does he accept it with regard 
to obedience to a regime of exemptions? 
Moreover, even if a rule utilitarian justification is persuasive in principle, there are 
reasons to doubt the attractiveness of the particular proposal that Greene defends. I explore three 
such reasons below.  
First, Greene’s approach seems to ignore a great lesson of American Legal Realism: 
Granting a right to one party often amounts to denying a right to another party. The Supreme 
Court’s well-known decision in Miller v. Schoene35 illustrates the problem. Faced with the 
problem of cedar rust, an insect infestation that is harmless to cedar trees but kills apple trees 
when it is spread to them, Virginia law provided for the destruction of the cedars. Cedar owners 
claimed that the statute violated their property rights, but Justice Stone, writing for the Court, 
pointed out that failure to pass the law would violate the property rights of apple owners, who 
would see their property destroyed if the state did nothing. As Justice Stone explained, “the state 
was under the necessity of making a choice between the preservation of one class of property and 
that of the other wherever both existed in dangerous proximity. It would have been none the less 
a choice if, instead of enacting the present statute, the state, by doing nothing, had permitted 
serious injury to the apple orchards within its borders to go on unchecked.”36 
A similar problem plagues religious opt-outs. Consider Greene’s example, drawn from 
the work of Brian Barry,37 concerning a statute requiring all animals to be stunned before 
slaughter. The statute is favored by animal rights advocates who argue that animals so treated 
suffer less pain and distress, but it interferes with religious beliefs of some Muslims and Jews 
who insist on the ritual slaughter of animals that will be consumed by humans. Greene 
characterizes this as a conflict between a “claim on behalf of the animals” and a “claim from 
religious truth.”38 He recognizes that the case is hard, but concludes that the religious claim 
should prevail.39 
 Greene is able to reach this conclusion only because he mischaracterizes the conflict, at 
least in some cases. Instead of a conflict between animals on one side and a human religious 
claim on the other, there are often human religious claims on both sides of the dispute. There are 
people whose religious convictions are violated by eating meat not slaughtered in a certain way, 
but there are other people whose religious convictions are violated by permitting the infliction of 
suffering on animals.40 If we enforce the stunning law against Jews and Muslims, they will have 
to choose between their loyalty to the state and their loyalty to other normative systems. But if 
we grant them an exemption, then enforcement of our background laws that prevent animal 
rights advocates from using self-help forces a similar choice on these advocates. The problem, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 276 U.S. 272 (1928). 
36 Id. at 279. 
37 See BRIAN BARRY, CULTURE AND EQUALITY: AN EGALITARIAN CRITIQUE OF MULTICULTURALISM 40-42 (2001) 
(describing the conflict between humane slaughter statutes and religious precepts). 
38 GREENE, supra note 1, at 127. 
39 Id. (“Exempting ritual slaughter from the stunning rules is a plausible way of finding a middle ground between 
two claims of right – the claim on behalf of the animals and the claim from religious truth. . . . It is not inconsistent 
to believe that the state has a sufficient interest for the baseline regulation, but an insufficient one when confronted 
with an exemption claim arising from a comprehensive belief system.”). 
40 For an example, see Robert Tappan, Why Religion is Important to the Animal Rights Movement, JESUSVEG.COM, 
http://www.jesusveg.com/2.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2013) (identifying the conflict between many religious belief 
systems and animal rights, and discussing alternative religious perspectives that support vegetarianism and animal 
rights). 
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then, is not whether to recognize religious sources of obligation, but which religious sources to 
recognize. 
This dilemma is only a particular instantiation of the general point that claims of 
obligation cannot be disentangled from substantive claims on the merits. The law of exemptions, 
like all law, cannot be trans-substantive because it forces us to choose between conflicting moral 
claims. A thoroughgoing opponent of legal obligation would embrace this point, but Greene 
must instead resist it because he inconsistently wants us to acknowledge an obligation to obey 
the system of exemptions that he favors. 
Just as legal realists have something to teach us about the exemption problem, so too do 
economists, and economics provides a second reason for doubt about Greene’s position. An 
economist would be quick to point out that allowing people to escape distasteful obligations 
because of their insistence that the obligations violate their religious commitments incentivizes 
them to have more religious commitments.41 This is not just a problem of dishonesty, although of 
course that is part of the problem. Even people who are completely honest will be more likely to 
come to hold views when they benefit from holding them.42  
This phenomenon provides part of the reason why many economists are distrustful of 
merely verbalized preferences and insist instead on revealed preferences – preferences that 
people are willing to vindicate by giving up something in return.43 For example, no economist 
would continence choosing between apple owners and cedar owners based on who complained 
most vociferously and moralistically about the destruction of their trees. Nor do we award people 
things like automobiles or houses simply because they assert that they need these things more 
than their present owners. Economists insist that people put their money where their mouths are. 
Should we, then, insist that religious objectors put their money where their mouths are? 
Greene is ambivalent about whether we ought to,44 and American law has taken inconsistent 
positions on this subject. On the one hand, we have a long tradition of requiring alternative 
service by conscientious objectors to the military draft. On the other, almost no one claims that 
churches that utilize the ministerial exception to fire employees otherwise covered by our 
antidiscrimination law should pay a special discrimination tax.45 
There is something to be said for both sides of this argument, but I ultimately side with 
the economists. The point is not just that making people pay for their asserted preferences 
measures the existence and weight of these preferences. It is also fundamentally unfair to allow 
some people to opt out of our common social obligations without giving up something in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 See, e.g., STEVEN E. LANDSBURG, THE ARMCHAIR ECONOMIST: ECONOMICS AND EVERYDAY LIFE 3 (1993) (“Most 
of economics can be summarized in four words: ‘People respond to incentives.’ The rest is commentary.”). 
42 For an introduction to the large literature explaining the psychological processes by which people “creatively 
combine accessed knowledge to construct new beliefs that could logically support the desired conclusion,” see Ziva 
Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480, 483 (1990). 
43 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103, 119 (1979) 
(“The only kind of preference that counts in a system of wealth maximization is . . . one that is backed up by money 
– in other words, that is registered in a market.”). 
44 See GREENE, supra note 1, at 129-30 (arguing that there are circumstances where it makes sense to impose a 
burden on those requesting religious exemptions, but in general these burdens are not necessary to determine the 
validity of religious beliefs and simply impose another burden on “the oft-beleaguered minority”). 
45 The Supreme Court mandated a ministerial exception in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School 
v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 709 (2012) (explaining that the ministerial exception “ensures that the authority to select 
and control who will minister to the faithful . . . is the church’s alone”). 
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return.46 Perhaps religious believers are entitled to an exemption from laws they cannot in good 
conscience obey, but I know of no conscientiously held system of beliefs that entitles them to a 
free ride. A person who wishes to use peyote for a religious ritual cannot simply take peyote 
belonging to another without paying for it. Why not impose similar obligations on people who 
take collective goods? If war resisters must pay in kind for their resistance, then what about 
antidiscrimination resisters? 
I think that the argument for insisting on compensatory payment is quite strong, but it is 
easy to see why Greene wants to resist it. The problem is that recognition of a duty to pay has the 
potential to destroy the accommodationist position. After all, on a Holmsean theory, the damages 
violators of antidiscrimination law must pay represent the price society charges for violating 
these laws.47 More broadly, on both standard Kantian and utilitarian theories, criminal 
punishment is conceptualized as the payment for seizing social goods. Kant famously believed 
that criminal punishment was necessary to settle accounts – to put the universe back in balance 
after the criminal takes something without paying for it.48 Similarly, on utilitarian theories of 
punishment, the criminal sanction does no more than make criminals internalize the cost of their 
crimes.49 Put differently, criminal punishment assures that the crime reflects the criminal’s 
revealed preference. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Greene’s response to this argument is that “[m]embers of minority religious groups . . . are subject to many social 
costs from the gamut of laws that don’t respond to their notions of the right or the good; an occasional legislatively 
or judicially awarded exemption is unlikely to put them in a superior position to others from an overall cost 
perspective.” GREENE, supra note 1, at 130. 
This argument is unpersuasive. Perhaps, as Greene asserts, there is no general obligation to obey the law. 
But presumably not even Greene thinks that disadvantaged individuals have a special right to disobey laws because 
they come out on the short end of the social contract. An individual who pays very high taxes and uses very few 
social services does not have a special right to disobey “no parking” signs. We impose a general obligation on 
people to incur social costs without attempting the impossible task of calculating global costs and benefits on an 
individual level. It is fair for everyone to obey generally applicable laws because individuals are part of a society, 
not because the costs and benefits of our laws impact everyone equally. 
Greene does not appear to disagree with this general proposition. He favors a departure from it only for 
individuals who conscientiously oppose a particular law. But once we acknowledge that we do not generally permit 
disobedience because of individualized judgments about the costs and benefits of the social contract, Greene needs 
to explain why conscientious objectors should, uniquely, be given a free ride. Notice that the answer cannot be that 
violation of a religious commitment imposes especially severe costs on believers. According to the proposal 
discussed in Greene’s book, no one is required to violate a religious commitment. Individuals asserting religious 
claims are merely required to pay a fair price for avoiding obligations to which everyone else is subject. 
47 See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 458 (1897) (“One of the many evil 
effects of the confusion between legal and moral ideas . . . is that theory is apt to get the cart before the horse, and to 
consider the right or the duty as something existing apart from and independent of the consequences of its breach, to 
which certain sanctions are added afterward. But . . . a legal duty so called is nothing but a prediction that if a man 
does or omits certain things he will be made to suffer in this or that way by judgment of the court.”). Holmes 
extended this point even to the death penalty. See 1 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. 
JUSTICE HOLMES AND HAROLD J. LASKI, 1916-1935, at 806 (1953) (“If I were having a philosophical talk with a man 
I was going to have hanged . . . I should say, I don’t doubt that your act was inevitable for you but to make it more 
avoidable by others we propose to sacrifice you to the common good. You may regard yourself as a soldier dying for 
your country if you like. But the law must keep its promises.”) 
48 IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 105-06 (Mary Gregor ed., 1996). 
49 See, e.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 325 (R. Hildreth trans., 1864) (“[T]o prevent an offence, it 
is necessary that the repressive motive should be stronger than the seductive motive. The punishment must be more 
an object of dread than the offence an object of desire.”). 
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It follows that if one accepts the argument for compensation, one backs into something 
like the test articulated by the Supreme Court in Employment Division v. Smith.50 On this view, 
the state has no obligation to accommodate religious practice, but neither can it single out such 
practice for special penalties.51 Of course, Greene wants to reject Smith.52 But that rejection 
entails acceptance of a constitutional requirement that religious believers systematically bear less 
of the collective social burden than the rest of us. This position needs to be defended, and I find 
no adequate defense of it in Greene’s book. 
This problem, in turn, leads to a third difficulty. Suppose that Greene is right when he 
insists that we should respect alternative sources of normative authority. I think that Greene pays 
insufficient attention to how we should manifest that respect. Paradoxically, the best way to 
manifest respect may be by punishing violators. This conclusion is undoubtedly counterintuitive, 
but it flows naturally from taking seriously the possibility of sources of authority that are 
authentically incompatible with state authority.53 
To see why this is so, we need to understand why claims grounded in these sources of 
authority are arguably entitled to special treatment. No one thinks that proponents of, say, 
government subsidies for dairy farmers or of raising the minimum wage are entitled to special 
legislative or judicial solicitude. This remains true even if these proponents feel very strongly 
about the subject and even if the measures they favor are essential to their ways of life. Why 
should we treat religiously-motivated actors differently? 
The best answer – an answer that I think Greene would endorse – is that religious 
objectors are using a different and incompatible metric to judge the rightness of actions. Dairy 
farmers and advocates of workers’ rights may feel strongly about their causes, but they are 
nonetheless speaking the lingua franca of interest group politics. They have things they feel 
strongly about, but other groups have claims upon us that they also feel strongly about. These 
groups settle their differences within the norms and boundaries set by liberal democracies. 
Religious claims are special because they are founded on a rejection of these norms and 
boundaries. Religious systems of belief are incompatible with western democratic liberalism in 
the sense that they require commitments that are outside the realm of compromise and interest 
group trades. As Greene rightly points out, it is for these reasons that the secular state is 
precluded from endorsing these claims. The other half of the bargain, he insists, is that the state 
respects these claims by exempting those who make them from ordinary laws.54 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881-82 (1990). 
51 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531-32 (1993) (“[O]ur cases 
establish the general proposition that a law that is neutral and of general applicability need not be justified by a 
compelling governmental interest even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious 
practice. . . A law failing to satisfy these requirements must be justified by a compelling governmental interest and 
must be narrowly tailored to advance that interest.”). 
52 Greene, supra note 1, at 116 (“I criticize the Court’s holding in Employment Division v. Smith, which refused to 
engage in stepped-up judicial scrutiny for laws incidentally burdening religions practice; I maintain that judicial 
exemptions for the free exercise of religions should be considered a matter of constitutional right.”). 
53 For a fuller articulation of this argument, see Mark Tushnet, In Praise of Martyrdom?, 87 CAL. L. REV. 1117, 
1118-19 (1999) (explaining the view that political accommodations may damage religions because “believers may 
be disappointed when the State’s accommodations reach their limit,” and because religious institutions may change 
to secure attractive accommodations). 
54 See GREENE, supra note 1, at 155 (“[T]he Free Exercise Clause can be seen as providing a political counterweight 
to the Establishment Clause. If the latter should be read to prevent religious faith from being the predominant, 
express justification for law, then the former should be construed to make religious faith a ground for avoiding the 
obligations of law.”). 
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This is indeed a powerful argument for the special status of these claims, but 
unfortunately for Greene it points away from rather than toward a system of exemptions. We can 
see this by examining the precise mechanisms by which exemptions are granted and withheld. If 
we join Greene in rejecting the notion that religious believers are entitled to a blanket exemption 
from any law that they oppose, then we will need some decision making body to determine the 
occasions for and extent of exemptions. 
For obvious reasons, these decisions cannot be made by the religious believers 
themselves. At least in theory, one might imagine a neutral institution outside the state or 
religion making these decisions. But although this is a theoretically possible solution, it is not a 
realistic one and not one that Greene proposes. 
The only practical means of resolving controversies of this sort is for the government to 
decide when to defer to religious authority. But government decisions of this sort do not involve 
true deference to that authority. Governments that make these decisions will use the tools and 
criteria that governments use. If government and religion are truly incompatible, then the use of 
these tools and criteria will inevitably create a government version of religion rather than religion 
itself. The result is not deference to religion, but corruption of it. What was once a truly 
subversive and destabilizing alternative world view is normalized and defanged. 
It is just this mindset that has produced abominations like the “plastic reindeer” rule for 
permitting Christmas displays on public property55 and the endorsement of ceremonial deism that 
permits references to religious belief in the public square precisely because these references have 
lost their meaning.56 When the government accommodates religion, it will do so for “safe” 
religions  that mandate relatively harmless idiosyncrasies like the use of drugs in a religious 
ritual or the teaching of creationism by home schoolers. What the state will not tolerate is a 
fundamental challenge to its authority – for example, acting on a claim that the organizing norms 
of the secular state are illegitimate and should be replaced by overtly religious commitments. 
Claims such as these are what make religion truly destabilizing and demonstrate the true 
incompatibility between religious and secular authority. But for just these reasons, the state 
cannot possibly accommodate them. To do so would be to sacrifice the trans-substantive, 
bridging function that is thought to give secular law its authority in the first place. 
The upshot is cooptation of religion to serve state purposes, rather than authentic respect. 
If the state wants to show true respect for religion as an authentically incompatible world view – 
if it wants to truly recognize the mortal threat that religion poses to state authority – then it can 
act in only one way. It must punish believers when they disobey state authority. Any other 
reaction denies and destroys the incompatibility that makes religion dangerous and attractive in 
the first place.  
II. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984) (finding no violation of the Establishment Clause in a city’s 
public display of a nativity scene, which the Court viewed “in the context of the Christmas season,” rather than 
focusing “exclusively on the religious component”). For representative criticism of the rule, see Frederick Mark 
Gedicks, Lynch and the Lunacy of Secularized Religion, 12 NEV. L.J. 640, 643 (2012) (“[E]ven theologically potent 
symbols of majoritarian religion may be appropriated and deployed by government so long as surrounded by some 
minimum of secular symbols – like, say, three plastic reindeer. Thus was born one of the silliest and most incoherent 
lines of Supreme Court decisions ever, one in which the Court is still hopelessly entangled.”). 
56 See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 44 (2004) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Any 
coercion that persuades an onlooker to participate in an act of ceremonial deism is inconsequential, as an 
Establishment Clause matter, because such acts are simply not religious in character.”). 
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The main thesis of my book is that American constitutional law cannot serve a trans-
substantive bridging function. Unlike Greene, I make no claim about law in general, or even  
about constitutional law in general. My more modest claim is that the American Constitution, 
replete with senseless and pernicious eccentricities, written a very long time ago by people far 
removed from our modern lives and culture, and extremely difficult to amend, should not bind 
those who disagree with its substantive commands. The claim that it is binding distorts political 
argument by shifting it from the substantive merits of various proposals to a counterproductive 
and ultimately pointless argument about constitutional doctrine. Instead of arguing about whether 
the Affordable Health Care Act makes sense, we end up arguing about the true meaning of The 
Federalist Papers and the precise holding of Wickard v. Filburn.57 
It follows that whatever hold law in general has over us, we should free ourselves from 
the shackles of the American Constitution. Not surprisingly, this claim has not exactly met with 
universal assent. In this section, I respond to some of the criticisms that have been advanced 
against it.  
A. 
I start with Professor Greene’s generous comments58 and with related, and similarly 
generous, comments by Professors Hugh Baxter59 and James Fleming.60 If I understand Professor 
Greene’s position correctly, he rejects original meaning and precedent as well as modern 
Supreme Court pronouncements as sources of constitutional authority.61 Professor Fleming 
professes greater concern for “fit,” but he too insists that fidelity to the Constitution means 
fidelity to our aspirations at a very high level of generality. As he puts it, “Fidelity on this 
understanding is not obedience to decisions already made for us in the past by people long dead 
or who were ignorant of the challenges and problems of our age. Fidelity rather is an attitude of 
commitment to making the scheme work and to further developing it . . . in ways the better to 
realize its ends and our aspirations.”62 
If this position entails the view that the Constitution can mean anything we want it to 
mean, then I have no serious disagreement with either Greene or Fleming. I have no quarrel with 
Greene’s suggestion that at any particular moment in time, people should think about the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942). Compare, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2588 (2012) 
(Roberts, C.J.) (“The farmer in Wickard was at least actively engaged in the production of wheat, and the 
Government could regulate that activity because of its effect on commerce. The Government’s theory here would 
effectively override that limitation.”), with id. at 2621 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Nor does our 
case law toe the activity versus inactivity line. In Wickard, for example, we upheld the penalty imposed on a farmer 
who grew too much wheat, even though the regulation had the effect of compelling farmers to purchase wheat in the 
open market.”). 
58 See generally Greene, supra note 24 (arguing that, in analyzing our constitutional obligations, we should 
“distinguish obligation to the Constitution as a text, as a governing and structuring document, from obligation to any 
particular interpretation or purportedly authoritative meaning of that text”). 
59 See generally Hugh Baxter, Critical Reflections on Seidman’s On Constitutional Disobedience, 93 B.U. L. REV. 
(2013) (critiquing Seidman’s concept of “constitutional disobedience” and likening it to “constitutional 
irreverence”). 
60 See generally James E. Fleming, Fit, Justification, and Fidelity in Constitutional Interpretation, 93 B.U. L. REV. 
(2013) (advocating for “a ‘philosophical approach’ to constitutional interpretation”). 
61 See GREENE, supra note 1, at 161-209 (critiquing the idea of obligation “to prior sources of constitutional 
meaning, [and] rejecting an interpretive duty to follow either original understanding or meaning or the teachings of 
[Supreme Court] precedent”). 
62 Fleming, supra note 60, at  
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relationship between the structure of government and their deeper commitments, 63 or with 
Fleming’s view that political debate should be about the best method to achieve our joint 
aspirations.64 If one wants to call this kind of debate “constitutional,” I have at most mild 
objections to the label. This is a “constitution” that sharpens deliberation rather than ends it, that 
forces us to confront our differences rather than attempting to bridge them. Such a constitution 
imposes an obligation to think and to debate, but not an obligation to obey. 
I fear, though, that this is not quite what Greene and Fleming mean. First, I wonder what 
Fleming and Greene think of hard wired and unambiguous constitutional text. Consider, for 
example, the provision in Article I providing for two senators from each state without regard to 
population. Fleming says that past decisions do not “deserve our fidelity” when they “fall[] short 
of our aspirations.”65 If a grossly malapportioned Senate “falls short of our aspirations,” as it 
surely does, does that mean that we can ignore the clear text of Article I? If it does, then Fleming 
and I have no disagreement at all. But I doubt that this is what Fleming means because disregard 
of clear text would seem to jettison the “fit” requirement to which he is attached. 
Similarly, I am not sure how seriously to take Greene’s rejection of standard sources of 
constitutional authority. As I discuss above,66 Greene advances a constitutional argument for a 
limited requirement of religious accommodations.67 I suspect that when he says that these 
accommodations are constitutionally mandatory, he means something other than that they are 
simply provisions he favors. Greene seems to be making the assertion that even people who do 
not favor religious accommodations are somehow obligated to endorse them. But what is the 
source of this obligation? How can Greene oppose legal obligation in general, but endorse 
constitutional obligation, which is, after all, a form of legal obligation?68 
This question leads to my primary concern with the positions that Fleming and Greene 
advance. They present their positions as if constitutional argument amounted to no more than a 
good faith dialogue about how to achieve our deepest commitments as a country. But as things 
presently stand, constitutional law is a way that some people exercise power over other people. 
When the Supreme Court renders a decision prohibiting state officials from using affirmative 
action or requiring them to recognize gay marriages, it is not just engaging in dialogue; it is 
ordering people to do things against their will. I am certainly no originalist, but at least fidelity to 
text and original understanding attempts to ground this coercion in something other than the 
untrammeled desires of nine people. The same cannot be said for exercises of power untethered 
to anything other than deeply contestable views about the best version of our national 
commitments. If we choose to have nine people exercising power in this way, then we ought to 
stop pretending that they are engaged in anything recognizable as constitutional interpretation. I 
am afraid that the positions advanced by Greene and Fleming promote this pretense. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Greene, supra note 24, at (“[C]itizen acceptance may just involve a sociological fact of treating the Constitution 
as the relevant, salient document constructing the basic legal order, That is, citizens may adopt an internal point of 
view about the Constitution as theirs . . . [and] may see the Constitution’s norms as guides to their own conduct.”). 
64 Fleming, supra note 60, at (“The Constitution – to be worthy of our fidelity – must reflect our aspirations to 
realize the ends proclaimed in the Preamble. To do that, we must reject any idea of an obligation to follow original 
expected applications or precedents as such. Fidelity to our imperfect Constitution entails fidelity in pursuit of our 
constitutional aspirations and ends.”). 
65 Fleming, supra note 60, at  
66 See supra Part I.B. (describing and critiquing Greene’s argument for religious legal exemptions). 
67 See GREENE, supra note 1, at 149-157 (arguing for the lifting of legal burdens “as a matter of constitutional right, 
applicable to religious practice only”). 
68 See infra Part III. 
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Professor Fleming doubts that an open discussion about what is to be done would 
produce better outcomes than one that is labeled constitutional.69 Similarly, Professor Baxter 
fears that an open-ended discourse of this kind would have bad consequences. Baxter asks why 
all fundamental values talk, whether or not grounded in constitutional obligation, does not 
poison political discourse.70 Of course, Baxter is correct that discussions of foundational 
concepts like “liberty” and “equality,” can end in a shouting match even when disentangled from 
claims of constitutional obligation. In a country with wildly diverse political and moral views, 
shouting matches are inevitable. But  when we divorce this debate from constitutional rhetoric, at 
least the shouting will be about something that really matters. One cannot talk meaningfully 
about topics like health care reform without addressing our underlying conceptions of liberty and 
equality. One can and should talk about these proposals without talking about James Madison’s 
views on liberty and equality. 
Moreover, people in our political culture understand that nonconstitutional foundational 
principles are contestable. I may feel very strongly about my particular conception of liberty and 
equality, but I and everyone else understands that this conception is controversial. In contrast, 
many constitutional provisions are not open to contestation. Like it or not, the Constitution 
provides for an electoral college, a malapportioned Senate, and a president who cannot be a 
naturalized citizen. One could conceive of the Constitution’s more open, textured language as a 
site for contesting foundational principles. If everyone thought of the Constitution in this way, I 
would have much less difficulty with constitutional argument. But too many people do not think 
of the Constitution this way. They think of it as a document that commands obedience, not one 
that facilitates argument.  
Both Baxter and Fleming point out that our constitutional tradition will inevitably 
influence our views about concepts like liberty and equality.71 Of course, they are correct about 
this. Jettisoning constitutional obligation is not the same thing as wiping the slate clean. It is 
foolish to pretend that our current situation is not the product of several centuries of American 
history or that that history is not influenced by the Constitution. This is precisely why embracing 
constitutional disobedience is much less dangerous than many people think. We have deeply 
engrained habits of thought and action that we are unlikely to abandon just because the yoke of 
constitutional obligation has been lifted. This fact provides no reason why the yoke should not be 
lifted. 
On a more specific level, Greene and Baxter both worry that by taking an oath to support 
and defend the Constitution, public officials assume an obligation to obey it.72 More broadly, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Fleming, supra note 60, at (“Constitutional arguments that fit and justify our constitutional document and practice 
exert a greater claim on people than do utopian arguments: for the former are arguments about the best 
understanding of our practices, commitments, and aspirations.”). 
70 Baxter, supra note 59, at (“Seidman needs to explain why fundamental-values talk poisons and polarizes 
discourse only when constitutionalized, or at least why it’s especially dangerous in that form.”). 
71 See Id. at (“[I]t seems likely that some of the inclinations Seidman locates in ordinary all-things-considered 
thinking are shaped by our constitutional tradition and its norms. And so constitutionalism may have real effects – 
even effects Seidman might approve – outside of ‘constitutional obedience’ in Seidman’s sense.”); Fleming, supra 
note 60, at (“Constitutional arguments that fit and justify our constitutional document and practice exert a greater 
claim on people than do utopian arguments: for the former are arguments about the best understanding of our 
practices, commitments, and aspirations.”). 
72 See Greene, supra note 24, at [manuscript p. 3-5] (“[V]ia the oath or taking and doing their jobs or some 
combination, officials accept . . . the Constitution’s rules, which include duties and powers and limits on both. This 
gives us both a legal system, in Hart’s terms, and arguably, constitutional obligation, for officials.”); Baxter, supra 
note 59, at [manuscript p.1] (“When the U.S. Constitution directs or forbids action, usually it is understood to be 
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even without such an oath, public officials who assume offices derived from the Constitution 
incur a positional obligation of obedience. Baxter thinks that this point is so obvious that he 
generously refuses to believe that I have failed to recognize it. He therefore claims that my book 
“is not best understood as a manifesto urging government officials to violate their oaths and 
abandon support for the Constitution.”73 
I appreciate Professor Baxter’s desire to save me from embarrassment, but I’m afraid that 
my book is just such a manifesto. Perhaps I misunderstand the contrary position that Greene and 
Baxter advance, but it seems to me that their argument depends upon the very position that I 
insist on rejecting. The oath requirement is, itself, contained in Article VI, Section 3 of the 
Constitution. If, as I contend, we should not be bound by the Constitution then, prospectively at 
least, government officials should not be required to take the oath the Constitution mandates. 
What about officials who have already taken the oath? At most, qualms about oath 
violation would delay implementation of the new regime until the terms of office of these 
officials expire. Since my proposals are unlikely to gain general acceptance any time soon, I can 
certainly live with this delay. In any event the kind of “constitution” that I believe these officials 
have sworn to defend is not one that imposes obligation. 
Greene suggests that officials who take the oath or assume positions within our 
constitutional order often adopt H.L.A. Hart’s internal point of view74 and believe that the 
Constitution is binding on them. No doubt they do, but I argue that this belief is incorrect. 
Merely pointing out that some people presently disagree with my position is not an argument 
against it. 
B. 
Professor David Lyons is correct when he says that his “reconstruction” of my argument 
is “more categorical than [I] intended.”75 For example, he treats my assertion that other nations 
have gotten along fine without written constitutions as if I thought that this fact alone proved that 
the United States would be similarly successful if it abandoned constitutional obligation. I make 
no such claim. On the contrary, I have tried to be very careful in insisting that judgments about 
constitutional obligation need to be sensitive to the time, place, and circumstances where they are 
made.76 The experiences of other countries like the United Kingdom and New Zealand are 
instructive. They refute the claim that written constitutions are essential to the protection of 
individual liberties, and they provide some evidence that we might be able to thrive without 
constitutional obligation. It therefore seems appropriate to cite these examples in support of my 
argument. If I thought that these examples alone were dispositive, I would not have bothered to 
write an entire book advancing many other reasons why the United States would be better off 
without constitutional obligation. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
action on the part of government officials rather than ordinary citizens. And those officials take an oath to support 
the Constitution – an oath required by the text of the Constitution itself.”). 
73 Baxter, supra note 59, at  
74 See Greene, supra note 24, at (“[V]ia the oath or taking and doing their jobs or some combination, officials accept 
- in a Hartian sense - the Constitution’s rules, which include duties and powers and limits on both. This gives us both 
a legal system, in Hart’s terms, and arguably, constitutional obligation, for officials.”). 
75 Lyons, supra note 30,  
76 See CONSTITUTIONAL DISOBEDIENCE, supra note 3, at 18-19 (using Presidential decisions during the Civil War 
and Great Depression to illustrate the fact that we need to make “contextual decisions” about when the risk of 
anarchy are real, and “whether and when they outweigh countervailing reasons for ignoring the text”); see generally 
Louis Michael Seidman, Acontextual Judicial Review, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1143, 1143 (2011) (“Like any other 
institution, constitutional review must be evaluated within a particular temporal, cultural, and political context.”). 
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Similarly, Lyons claims that I believe that “public discussion of laws and public policies 
is healthy and robust when constitutional issues do not arise.”77 Of course, I believe no such 
thing. There are many pathologies infecting modern American politics, perhaps the most 
egregious of which are the tremendous differences in education and wealth that people bring to 
public discussion. I wrote a book about one problem. The fact that we have many other problems 
is no excuse for not dealing with this one. 
Lyons complains that I fail to “tell us what we could expect if we got rid of our written 
constitution” and that, in particular, I have not predicted whether we would “maintain the same 
constitutional framework.”78 If Lyons means by this that I have not made precise predictions 
about the future of American politics, I plead guilty. Neither I nor Professor Lyons can predict 
the trajectory of American politics if (as seems overwhelmingly likely) a regime of constitutional 
obedience remains in place. Why should he expect more on the assumption that the shackles of 
constitutionalism are lifted? 
If Lyons’ complaint is instead about my failure to specify the broad outlines of our 
constitutional order in the wake of the changes I propose, then I am afraid he has not read my 
book carefully enough. I devote many pages to defending my predictions that civil liberties are 
likely to remain intact, 79 that we will not devolve into Hobbesian chaos,80 and that inertial forces 
are likely to keep the main institutions of government in place.81 
Lyons claims that a “preoccupation with constitutionality does not result from the 
Constitution’s being written; it is occasioned by the practice of judicial review.”82 This 
undefended claim rests on a serious misunderstanding of American constitutional law. As 
advocates of popular constitutionalism and departmentalism have demonstrated, other political 
actors are perfectly capable of respecting constitutional obligation.83 For example, no court has 
ever held that Arnold Schwarzenegger could not run for President because he was born outside 
the United States. If the issue were to arise, a court might well hold that the issue was a 
nonjusticiable political question. Yet a Schwarzenegger candidacy was never a serious 
possibility because of general acquiescence to constitutional commands. 
The point that Lyons misses is that while judicial review is one way to enforce the 
Constitution, it is not the only way. Of course, if the Constitution were completely unenforced, 
then constitutional obligation would disappear. But the method of enforcement is beside the 
point. Even if enforced only by political actors, constitutionalism requires replacing our present 
all-things-considered judgments with archaic and often pernicious decisions made by people who 
are long dead. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Lyons, supra note 30, at  
78 Id. 
79 See CONSTITUTIONAL DISOBEDIENCE, supra note 3, at 19-20 (using countries without written constitutions and 
infamous Supreme Court decisions to demonstrate that “[i]t is far from obvious that . . . countries, which lack 
written constitutions, have less robust traditions of protection for civil liberties”). 
80 See id. at 18-19 (“When the risks of unraveling [into anarchy] are small, or . . . when constitutional obedience 
itself might produce unraveling, the anarchy and tyranny argument does nothing to support constitutionalism. When 
the risks are large, constitutional obligation is unnecessary because almost everyone will make an all-things-
considered judgment that we should follow constitutional text.”). 
81 See id. at 63-91 (responding to fears about what society would look like in the absence of a constitution by 
arguing that “we do not need to speculate about a world with widespread constitutional violation because this is the 
world in which we already live”). 
82 Lyons, supra note 30, at  
83 For an extended discussion, see MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 33-94 
(1999). 
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Lyons himself recognizes that the presumption in favor of constitutional obedience can 
be “overridden by considerations of justice and humanity.”84 Unfortunately, however, he fails to 
explain why he thinks that there should be a presumption in favor of constitutional obedience at 
all. Constitutionalists ask us to settle the issues that divide us according to commands authored 
centuries ago by people who knew nothing of our present circumstances, who entertained many 
bizarre ideas about the world, and who themselves acted unlawfully. If we are to have 
presumptions, then surely the presumption should be against fidelity to their work. 
C. 
Khiara Bridges understandably worries that “abortion access in an era of constitutional 
infidelity would likely be reduced substantially from the levels that adult women with the ability 
to pay enjoy in our present era of constitutional fidelity.”85 For those of us who share Professor 
Bridges’ commitment to reproductive autonomy, her warning poses a serious challenge to my 
argument. 
It is at best debatable, however, whether constitutional obligation played an important 
role in establishing the abortion right a generation ago. As Bridges acknowledges,86 even many 
defenders of Roe v. Wade87 doubt that Justice Blackmun’s constitutional argument deserves to 
be taken seriously. As she puts it, the abortion right was established “by hook or crook.”88 If she 
is correct, then the abortion right was established by constitutional disobedience, not 
constitutional fidelity. 
Nor is it clear that constitutional obligation has provided a secure foundation for abortion 
rights. As things stand now, the abortion right depends upon the uncertain vote of a single, 
elderly justice. It seems obvious that the future of reproductive freedom rests more on the life 
expectancy of the justices, the vagaries of presidential politics, and the trajectory of cultural 
change than on constitutional obligation. 
There is a more fundamental problem with Bridges’ position. On careful reading, it 
becomes clear that she, herself, does not believe in constitutional obligation. Her claim is not that 
women should have access to abortions because this is what the text of the constitution demands. 
Instead, her belief in reproductive freedom, like mine, rests on extra-constitutional norms. Her 
argument is entirely instrumental: the belief by others in constitutional obligation might preserve 
rights that she favors for reasons that have nothing to do with the Constitution. 
Perhaps Bridges is right about this, but it is important to see that this is not an argument 
in favor of constitutional obligation. It is, instead, an argument in favor of tricking others into 
believing in an obligation so as to achieve extra-constitutional objectives. The point becomes 
obvious if we imagine that Professor Bridges came to believe that the Constitution, properly 
interpreted, prohibited states from allowing abortions. On this set of facts, none of the arguments 
Bridges advances in her comments would support constitutional obligation. On the contrary, her 
arguments would support disobedience. 
Properly understood, Professor Bridges’ argument poses perhaps the most difficult 
problem in political theory: Is it appropriate to manipulate others through arguments that we 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Lyons, supra note 30, at (emphasis omitted). 
85 Khiara M. Bridges, Abortion Access in an Era of Constitutional Infidelity, 93 B.U. L. REV. (2013). 
86 Id. at (citing Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s Madison Lecture to support the proposition that “[t]here are even those who 
support a woman’s right to choose . . . who disagree with the reasoning in Roe” and think the Court should have 
decided the case on equal protection grounds). 
87 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (holding that the Constitution guarantees a right of privacy that is “broad enough to 
encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy”). 
88 Bridges, supra note 85, at  
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ourselves do not believe in order to achieve results that we favor? I am not sure of the answer to 
this question, and I do not propose one in my book. These are the sorts of questions we will have 
to confront once we get over the silly idea that the right to an abortion ought to depend on the 
proper interpretation of a particular text. 
III 
In this final section, I discuss the relationship between my argument and Professor 
Greene’s. Does constitutional obligation entail general political obligation? Does the rejection of 
general political obligation entail constitutional disobedience? 
In an earlier book, I argued that constitutional obligation requires obedience to lower 
level lawmaking made pursuant to the constitution.89 Professor Greene rejects this conclusion, 
but his reasoning is unclear. He writes: 
The legitimacy of a constitution . . . may result from conditions of its acceptance or from 
its justness or participatory rights or some combination, and thus be a constitutional order 
worthy of support and one we should not actively undermine. But this is not the same 
thing as saying government under such a constitution is justified in demanding that its 
subjects always obey the law, or that we have an obligation to do so.90 
I am puzzled by this assertion. Constitutions set out the mechanisms by which laws 
become binding. Articles I and VI of our Constitution, for example, provide that measures 
passed by majorities of both Houses of Congress, signed by the President, and in conformance 
with the various internal and external constitutional constraints on congressional power are the 
“supreme law of the land.” If these procedures are followed, and if we have an obligation to obey 
the Constitution, then it would seem that we have a subsidiary duty to obey provisions that the 
Constitution makes binding. 
Of course, the Constitution itself negates legal obligation to obey some measures passed 
by Congress and signed by the President. A statute prohibiting criticism of government officials 
does not have the force of law. Professor Greene seems to think that the Constitution contains a 
prohibition on the enforcement of some laws against some conscientious objectors to those laws. 
If this is correct, and if the Constitution binds us, then we are bound to disregard these measures. 
The puzzle is how Professor Greene can argue that we are bound by this constitutional 
prohibition. If, as he insists, conditions of acceptance, justness, and participatory rights are 
insufficient to create prima facie general political obligation, then why are they sufficient to 
create constitutional obligation, which is, after all, a form of political obligation? More generally, 
I think that a full defense of Greene’s argument for constitutional opt outs requires an answer to 
the many objections I have made to any form of constitutional obligation. 
For these reasons, I believe constitutional obligation entails more general political 
obligation, and a rejection of political obligation entails constitutional disobedience. Does it 
follow that a rejection of constitutional obligation entails a broader rejection of general political 
obligation? I think not. I set out my reasons for this conclusion at length in my book,91 so I will 
only sketch the argument here. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 See LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, OUR UNSETTLED CONSTITUTION: A NEW DEFENSE OF CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 17 (2001) (“Law made pursuant to a scheme that is binding is itself binding precisely because it is 
made pursuant to a binding scheme. For example, if a constitution permits statutes to be entrenched, and if the 
constitution itself is legitimate, it would follow that the entrenchment the constitution permits is also legitimate.”).  
90 GREENE, supra note 1, at 26. 
91 CONSTITUTIONAL DISOBEDIENCE, supra note 3, at 117-30 (explaining why “[o]ne can forego constitutional 
obligation without giving up on legal obligation more generally, and one can condemn using the Constitution as a 
foundation without giving up on a more general foundationalism”). 
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On the one hand, constitutional obligation imposes costs that more general political 
obligation does not. In our political culture, the Constitution is thought to settle arguments with 
finality. If I persuade you that the Constitution prohibits X, it is not an acceptable response to say 
that the Constitution is evil. In contrast, people regularly argue that ordinary statutes are evil and 
should be repealed. 
On the other hand, there are arguments for obedience to ordinary statutes that do not 
apply to constitutional obedience. For example, defenders of general political obligation argue 
that societies cannot survive without law and that because we all get the benefit of law, we have 
an obligation to each other to obey it. Greene rejects these arguments, and perhaps he is right to 
do so. But whether he is right or not, it is simply untrue that societies cannot survive without 
constitutions. On the contrary, to the extent that we have obligations to each other, we owe it to 
our fellow citizens to undermine the slavish adherence to a constitutional text that has stood in 
the way of authentic political freedom for far too long. 
